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DEFAMATION IS MORE THAN JUST A TORT:
A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR
INTERNET STUDENT SPEECH
I. INTRODUCTION
The school is a special environment. While school officials
must be able to punish student behavior, students have an
arguably equal interest in preserving their First Amendment
right to free speech. Through a series of Supreme Court
decisions, the law is well established that students do not enjoy
the same First Amendment protections as adults. This
differential treatment is grounded in historical notions of the
significant impact schools have on America’s youth.
As early as Brown v. Board of Education, the Court held
that education is essential to our democratic society, as schools
are “a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”1 Since
Brown, the Court has stated that the school must balance the
“unpopular and controversial views in schools and
classrooms . . . against the society’s countervailing interest in
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior.”2 A school does not have to tolerate speech that is
inconsistent with its “basic educational mission.”3 Schools may
regulate speech in school-sponsored, expressive activities that
are related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.4 The school’s
role is to provide the “fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system” and thus the
Court has made exceptions to First Amendment protections in
order to allow the school to achieve these democratic notions
of education.5
Despite the expansive role of schools in monitoring student
speech, the Court has limited its analysis to speech that takes
place on school grounds or during school-related activities.
1

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1985).
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
3
Id. at 685.
4
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
5
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979).
2
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Promoting values through schooling has not been expanded to
off-campus speech that is disseminated through the Internet.
This is problematic as the Internet is playing an increasingly
important role in the lives of children. What students say over
the Internet, specifically on social networking sites like
MySpace and Facebook, is published material that can easily be
seen and read by their peers who most likely attend the same
school. When this written information defames school
personnel, usually an administrator or teacher, the school has
an interest in punishing this conduct. On the other hand, the
student has a right to free speech, especially within the
confines of his or her own home. Punishing students for what
they write on their home computers also can infringe on
parents’ right to raise their own children.
Traditionally, courts have relied on the Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District standard,
which holds that a school can punish student speech when that
speech “materially and substantially disrupt[s] the work and
discipline of the school.”6 However, this standard is
unworkable when punishing students for what they write on
the Internet from their home computers. This test was meant
to apply to student speech that occurs on school grounds.7
Further, the Tinker standard addresses school disruption,
which is not the main concern regarding student Internet
speech.8
No matter how courts rationalize their decisions, schools,
teachers, and administrators defend Internet student speech
cases involving school officials because of two prevailing
concerns: (1) the school official targeted by the student speech
will have his or her authority undermined;9 and (2) the
democratic goals of schooling will be disrupted.10 Similarly,
individuals bring defamation suits, specifically libel suits,
against those who speak ill of them because they are concerned
that their good name will be ruined, their authority will be
undermined, or that the institution that they are a part of—
6

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).

7

See id.
8
See id.
9

J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 941 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc);
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of
Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007).
10
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whether it be a business, a community, or society in general—
will be disrupted by the information that is written about
them.11 However, while a school official can bring a
defamation suit, the school itself lacks standing to pursue a
defamation case against a student. Further, even if a school
official were to bring a defamation suit, the underlying result
of the suit—to reward the plaintiff with monetary damages—
will not reinforce the democratic goals of schooling or have
the impact on the school environment that is required for a
punishment to be effective.
Currently, when a student brings a First Amendment claim
against a school district, the burden is on the school district to
show that it met the Tinker standard.12 Under this Note’s
proposed standard, when a student brings a claim, the school’s
defense would no longer rest on Tinker. Instead, the
defamation standard in tort would be used as a model to create
a new First Amendment standard to replace Tinker as a
defense. Using similar concepts, the standard would allow
schools to punish off-campus student Internet speech that
involves a school official and reaches a defamatory level. This
test would also modify the standards of proof necessary to
implicate the speech since students are not entitled to full
constitutional protections as recognized by the Supreme Court
time and again.13 This standard would only apply to a narrow
category of speech, specifically off-campus Internet speech
that defames a school official. Thus, this defense would not
apply to other types of speech like offensive speech or true
threats. This standard would also not apply to student-onstudent defamatory speech or cyber bullying. While these are
important concerns, they fall outside the reach of this new
standard and therefore, outside the purview of this Note.
This Note urges the Supreme Court to adopt a standard
that will continue to balance a student’s right to free speech
with a school’s need to advance appropriate values. Part II
explains the history of Court decisions that modified
11

Libel, an action in tort, punishes published speech about the plaintiff that
injures the plaintiff’s reputation through false statements of fact. MARSHALL S.
SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW § 66.01 (3d ed. 2010).
12
Frank D. LoMonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students Are “Persons” Under Our
Constitution—Except When They Aren’t, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1323, 1328 (2009).
13
See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685
(1986).
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constitutional protections for students. Part III discusses the
circuit split that currently exists between the Second and Third
Circuits with regard to how schools can punish what students
say about school personnel on the Internet. Part IV examines
the problems associated with using the Tinker standard in the
Second and Third Circuit cases. Part V explores why civil
defamation is not an appropriate substitute for schools
punishing the student directly. Part VI advocates for the
adoption of a new First Amendment standard that is modeled
after the elements of defamation and accounts for the
modified protections of students. Part VII will apply this new
standard to the Second and Third Circuit cases and
demonstrate that the outcomes would not only be different,
but would resolve any split that currently exists from the
confusion of applying the Tinker standard.
II. THE HISTORY OF STUDENT PROTECTIONS
First Amendment protections are considered expressive
activities subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.14 Therefore, the
government cannot restrict free speech without a compelling
government interest.15 In addition, that regulation needs to
utilize the least restrictive means possible.16 However, Tinker
lowered this standard in the school setting. Tinker examined
the various contexts in which free speech claims relating to
schools could arise and determined that political, non-school
sponsored speech could be regulated if there was a “material
and substantial interference” with the school environment.17 In
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court found that
the school also had the right to punish offensive, lewd, and
indecent speech when spoken in the context of a schoolsponsored activity.18 Then, in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, the Court declared that schools could punish
speech that is part of a school-sponsored activity so long as the
regulation is reasonably related to a pedagogical concern.19
14

JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.01(b)
(8th ed. 2010).
15

Id.
Id.
17
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
18
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
16

19

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
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Instead of the traditional strict scrutiny standard, this rational
review standard made it very easy for schools to punish
students. In Morse v. Frederick, the Court continued this trend
by stating that schools may punish student speech that is
related to illegal drug use.20 However, the burden has always
been on the school district to provide a justifiable reason for
depriving students of their right to free speech.
The first significant Supreme Court case to address the
balance between a student’s First Amendment protections and
a school’s ability to regulate student speech is Tinker.21 In
Tinker, the Court invalidated a school’s policy prohibiting
students from wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam
War.22 The Court recognized that First Amendment rights,
even in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are still available to both students and teachers.23
Yet the Court also addressed its history of reinforcing the
school’s authority to control student behavior.24 Balancing
these two interests, the Court, ruling in favor of the students,
found that schools could not punish student expression only
to “avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”25 Schools can only
prohibit student speech that “might reasonably have led school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities”26 or actually does
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline
of the school.”27 In applying this standard, the Court found
that there were no facts in the case to show substantial
disruption. The two inches of black cloth did not disrupt
school activities or the lives of others. While the armbands may
have caused discussion outside the classroom, they did not

20

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007).

21

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.

22

ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: THE UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE
SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 13 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009).
23

Id.

24

Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Speech About School
Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591, 596
(2011).

25

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
Id. at 514.
27
Id. at 513.
26
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interfere with the classroom itself.28
While Tinker symbolizes the height of student protection,
this broad standard did not endure. In Fraser, the Court upheld
the school’s right to suspend a student for making a speech to
the student body that referred to another candidate in terms
of an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”29 The
Court first distinguished Tinker as being about a political
message, as opposed to sexual conduct.30 Instead of looking to
whether the speech caused a “substantial disruption,” the
Court found that the First Amendment does not protect
“vulgar and lewd” student speech since it has the ability to
“undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”31 The
Court also recognized the special environment that a school
provides. A school needs to be able to respond to
“unanticipated conduct” that disrupts the educational process.32
A school has an interest in protecting children from exposure
to speech that is inappropriate and offensive to minors.33 The
school is responsible for inculcating values by teaching
appropriate means of expression.34 While the Court was able to
reconcile this decision with Tinker, this case was the first
deviation toward the modern trend of favoring school
authority over First Amendment protections.
This trend continued in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, where the Court upheld a school’s policy of
regulating what types of articles could be published in the
school’s newspaper.35 Again, the Court established a new
standard that a school is not required to lend its name and
resources to the dissemination of student expression.36
Educators may regulate school-sponsored expression “to assure
that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed
to reach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material
that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that
the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously
28
29

Id. at 514.

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986).
Waldman, supra note 24, at 597.
31
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
32
Id. at 686.
33
Id. at 684.
34
DUPRE, supra note 22, at 49.
35
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
36
Id. at 272.
30
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attributed to the school.”37 A student’s First Amendment rights
are not violated when a school exercises editorial control of
style and content of school-sponsored student speech “so long
as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”38 Essentially, any student speech that is
pedagogically opposed to the school’s mission and might be
confused as school speech is not protected under the First
Amendment.39
Morse v. Frederick is the most recent Supreme Court case
to address the extent of Tinker.40 In Morse, the Court upheld a
school’s decision to suspend a student for unraveling a sign
that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school-sponsored
event.41 The Court found that deterring drug use by school
children is an “‘important—indeed, perhaps compelling’
interest” because of the dangers that it can pose to youth.42 In
light of various congressional statements and school board
policies, the Court found that the special environment of the
school and the governmental interest in stopping student drug
abuse outweighs students’ interest in freedom of expression.43
The school needs to be able to immediately react to situations
that violate school policy and need not tolerate speech that
promotes the dangers of illegal drug use.44
Morse’s interpretation of a school’s authority to regulate
student speech left an uncertain impact on the future of
student First Amendment protections.45 While the case
specifically allowed school administrators to punish student
speech that promoted illegal drug use,46 the implications of the
case are much broader. The case leaves open the possibility that
37
38

Id. at 271.
Id. at 273.

39
Rosemary Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of
Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253, 267–68 (1992).
40
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
41
Id. at 397.
42
Id. at 407 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
43
Id. at 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)). The court declined to apply the Tinker test, but also declined to consider
Frederick’s speech as “offensive” under Fraser. Id. at 409. The Court acknowledged

that much political and religious speech can be deemed offensive, but this case was
about the promotion of drug use. Id.
44

Id.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 409.
46
Id.
45
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a school can regulate anything that undermines the school’s
values. In his concurrence, Justice Alito stated that the
majority’s
opinion
“does
not
endorse
the
broad
argument . . . that the First Amendment permits public school
officials to censor any student speech that interferes with a
school’s ‘educational mission.’” However, it is not hard to
imagine other topics that the school would consider equivalent
to promoting illegal drug use and seek to regulate, such as
speech encouraging violence, sexual activity, or even skipping
school.47
The Morse decision has strayed the farthest from the
original intent of Tinker to preserve student’s First
Amendment rights.48 This speech took place on a public street
and did not cause any substantial disruption to the school
environment.49 Yet the school was still allowed to punish the
speech because the speech took place during a school activity
and could be construed to be about a topic that violates the
school’s mission.50 Although this holding allows for the
regulation of speech that takes place off-campus, but has a
nexus to the school, the Supreme Court has not addressed
whether Internet student speech that takes place on the
student’s home computer and is directed at school personnel
should likewise be regulated.
III. THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE SECOND AND THIRD CIRCUITS
The question of whether a school can punish what a
student writes about school personnel on the Internet from a
home computer has resulted in a split between the Second and
Third Circuits. The heart of this issue explores to what extent
Tinker extends to off-campus speech. The Second Circuit
addressed this question in two cases: Wisniewski v. Board of
Education of the Weedsport Central School District51 and
47

Id. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring); Erwin Chemerinsky, How Will Morse v.
Frederick Be Applied?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 17, 21–22 (2008); see also Joyce Dindo,
The Various Interpretations of Morse v. Frederick: Just a Drug Exception or a
Retraction of Student Free Speech Rights?, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 201, 233–34 (2008).
48
Morse, 551 U.S. at 409.
49
Caroline B. Newcombe, Morse v. Frederick One Year Later: New Limitations
on Student Speech and the “Columbine Factor,” 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 427, 437 (2009).
50
Id. at 436–37.
51
See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d
Cir. 2007).
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Doninger v. Niehoff.52 In both cases, the courts applied Tinker

to off-campus student Internet speech and ruled in favor of
the schools.
In Wisniewski, Aaron Wisniewski, an eighth-grader at
Weedsport Middle School used AOL Instant Messaging
software on his parents’ home computer to create an “IM icon”
which showed a drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s
head, with dots representing splattered blood.53 The drawing
was labeled “Kill Mr. VanderMolen.”54 Philip VanderMolen
was Aaron’s English teacher at the time this icon was created.55
While the icon was not sent to VanderMolen or other school
officials directly, the icon was sent to fifteen members on his
“buddy list,”56 some of whom attended Weedsport Middle
School and could view the icon for three weeks.57 One of
Aaron’s classmates gave Mr. VanderMolen a copy of the icon.58
Aaron admitted to creating and sending the icon.59 The
school initially suspended Aaron for five days and granted
VanderMolen’s request to stop teaching Aaron’s class.60 The
police determined that Aaron’s icon was just a joke and that he
did not intend to actually harm VanderMolen, so criminal
charges were dropped.61 However, at a superintendent’s
hearing, the hearing officer determined that the icon was
threatening and should have not been construed as a joke.62
Aaron was suspended for one semester and given alternative
education.63
In assessing whether the school had the authority to
suspend Aaron, the Second Circuit held that Tinker was the
appropriate standard to apply.64 The court ruled in favor of the
school, finding that even if Aaron’s icon was just an opinion, it
52

See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L.
53

REV. 1027, 1060 (2008).
61
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36.
62
63
64

Id.
Id.
Papandrea, supra note 60, at 1060–61.
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was not protected under the Tinker standard.65 Not only did
the icon “materially and substantially disrupt the work and
discipline of the school,” but it also was reasonably foreseeable
that the icon would come to the attention of school officials.66
It did not matter if Aaron never intended for either to occur.67
The court also found that the mere fact that the speech took
place off school grounds did not shield Aaron from
punishment.68
A year later, in Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit
again found that a school had the authority to punish what a
student wrote on the Internet.69 The court applied
Wisniewski’s interpretation of Tinker, stating that off-campus
speech that creates a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption
in a school “does not necessarily insulate the student from
school discipline.”70 In Doninger, a dispute arose between
school administration and a group of Student Council
members, including Avery Doninger, over the scheduling of
“Jamfest,” an annual battle-of-the-bands concert.71 Miller, the
teacher responsible for the auditorium’s sound and lighting
equipment, could not attend on the scheduled date, and
without Miller’s presence the students would be forced to
change the date or the location of the event.72
Avery and three other students drafted an e-mail to a large
number of people describing the situation.73 The e-mail told
recipients to contact Paula Schwartz, the district
superintendent, to ask that Jamfest be held as scheduled and
urged the recipients to forward the e-mail to more people.74
Additionally, Avery posted a message on her blog that said
jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. here is an email that
we sent to a ton of people . . . because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is
getting a TON of phone calls and emails . . . however, she got pissed off and
decided to just cancel the whole thing all together[ and] so basically we aren’t
65

Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 37.
Id. at 38–39.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 39.
66

69

Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 53 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 50 (quoting Wisniewski, 494 F.2d at 39).
71
Id. at 44.
70

72

Id.
Id.
74
Id.
73
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going to have it at all . . . .75

Avery then reproduced the e-mail that the Student Council
members sent out and also included a letter her mom sent to
Schwartz and Principal Niehoff so that those who read the
blog could “get an idea of what to write if you want to write
something or call her to piss her off more.”76 Several students
posted comments to the blog. One comment referred to
Schwartz as a “dirty whore.”77
Schwartz and Niehoff received many phone calls and emails about Jamfest.78 The controversy forced Schwartz and
Niehoff to miss or arrive late to several school-related
activities.79 When Niehoff learned of the blog, she decided
that Avery’s conduct did not “display the civility and good
citizenship expected of class officers.”80 The blog contained
“vulgar language” and “inaccurate information” and did not
demonstrate the proper way to confront school officials.81 As a
result, Niehoff prohibited Avery from running for Senior
Class Secretary.82
The Second Circuit, applying Wisniewski, found that
Avery’s blog involved school events and was written to
encourage others to comment on the post and to call and email school personnel.83 Therefore, it was reasonably
foreseeable that students and administrators would find out
about the blog.84 Additionally, the court pointed to three
factors that showed Avery’s blog would create a foreseeable
risk of substantial disruption.85 First, the language in the blog
was “plainly offensive” and had the potential to inhibit
cooperative conflict resolution.86 Second, the blog misled
students to believe Jamfest had been cancelled, which caused
75

Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45 (third alteration added).
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 46.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Papandrea, supra note 60, at 1062.
83
Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46.
84
Papandrea, supra note 60, at 1064.
85
Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50.
86
Id. at 50–51.
76
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students to get “‘all riled up’” and- to threaten a sit-in.87 Avery
and the other students involved had to be pulled away from
class or other activities to address the dispute.88 Schwartz and
Niehoff also missed or arrived late to activities because of the
dispute.89 Finally, the court thought that it was significant that
Avery’s punishment was removal from participation in student
government—an extracurricular activity, which is a privilege,
not a right.90 Avery’s activities undermined the ideals student
government is designed to promote, including good
citizenship, civility, and cooperative conflict resolution.91
Therefore, Avery’s speech was not protected by the First
Amendment.92
The Third Circuit has also addressed this question of
Internet student speech in two cases: Layshock v. Hermitage
School District93 and J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District.94
The Third Circuit’s original rulings on both cases resulted in
an internal circuit split.95 Therefore, both cases were reheard en
banc in June 2011.96 Each case was decided in favor of the
student.97 However, whether the Tinker standard should apply
to off-campus student Internet speech was not definitively
decided by either majority, but was raised as an issue in the
concurring and dissenting opinions of both cases.98
In Layshock, Justin Layshock, a student at Hickory High
School, used his grandmother’s computer to create a “parody
profile” on MySpace of his principal Eric Trosch.99 Besides
using a picture of Trosch from the school district’s website, no
school resources were used in the making of the profile.100
Justin gave a series of answers to survey questions that were
87

Id. at 51.
Id.
89
Id.
88

90

Papandrea, supra note 60, at 1062.
Id.
92
Doninger, 527 F.3d at 53.
91

93

Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
95
Layshock, 593 F.3d 249; J.S., 593 F.3d 286.
96
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 205; J.S., 650 F.3d at 915.
97
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 205; J.S., 650 F.3d at 915.
98
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 220; J.S., 650 F.3d at 936.
99
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207.
94

100

Id.
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based on being “big” since Trosch is a large man.101 Examples of
questions and answers include:
Birthday: too drunk to remember
Are you a health freak: big steroid freak
In the past month have you smoked: big blunt
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big dick
In the past month have you Stolen Anything: big keg
Ever been drunk: big number of times
Ever been called a Tease: big whore
Ever been Beaten up: big fag
Ever Shoplifted: big bag of kmart
102
Number of Drugs I have taken: big

Justin listed Trosch’s interests as “transgender, appreciators
of alcoholic beverages” and listed “steroids international” as a
club to which Trosch belonged.103 Justin listed other students as
“friends” on the MySpace page, which allowed them to view
the profile.104 As a result, most, if not all, of the student body
found out about the profile.105 Following Justin’s profile, three
other students made profiles of Trosch that were more vulgar
and offensive than Justin’s.106
Trosch discovered all four profiles and believed the
profiles were “‘degrading,’ ‘demeaning,’ ‘demoralizing,’ and
‘shocking.’”107 He was also concerned about his reputation and
contacted the local police, but he never filed criminal
charges.108 Justin made several in-school attempts to access the
profile and show it to other students, which the school did not
know about until their investigation the following week.109
School officials were forced to limit school Internet access and
cancel computer-programming classes.110

101

Id.
Id. at 208.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 208.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 209.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.; Erin Reeves, The “Scope of a Student”: How to Analyze Student Speech in
the Age of the Internet, 42 GA. L. REV. 1127, 1144–45 (2008).
102
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The school held a hearing and found Justin guilty of
violating several provisions of the school discipline code.111 He
was suspended for ten days, placed in the Alternative
Education Program for the remainder of the school year,
banned from all extracurricular activities, and denied
participation in his graduation ceremony.112 Justin was the only
one of the four profile creators to be punished.113
The Third Circuit reversed the school’s actions to rule in
favor of the student,114 primarily due to the district court’s
finding that there was not a “sufficient nexus between Justin’s
speech and a substantial disruption of the school
environment.”115 Since the school district did not challenge this
finding on appeal, the school district did not argue that it
could properly punish Justin under the Tinker standard.116 The
school district argued that a “sufficient nexus exist[ed]
between Justin’s creation and distribution of the vulgar and
defamatory profile of Principal Trosch and the school district
to permit the school district to regulate this conduct” because
Justin used Trosch’s picture from the district website, the
speech was aimed at the school and the principal, Trosch
accessed the website from a school computer, and it was
reasonably foreseeable that the school district and principal
would discover the website.117 The Third Circuit found,
however, that the minimal use of school resources in
connection with the website was not enough to create a nexus
with the school.118
Since the school district did not dispute the Tinker finding,
it also rested its argument on Fraser, which does not tolerate
lewd and vulgar speech.119 The school district cited both
Wisniewski and Doninger as support.120 However, the court
noted that Fraser does not extend to speech outside the school
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doors.121 Further, the court distinguished both Wisniewski and
Doninger by stating that in both cases the court found that
there was a substantial disruption to the work and discipline of
the school under Tinker.122 The court clearly noted that it did
not necessarily support the finding of Doninger, but
distinguished the case as a means of responding to the school’s
argument.123 The court noted that while Tinker may not be
limited to the school yard, “it would be an unseemly and
dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school
authorities, to reach into a child’s home and control his/her
actions there to the same extent that it can control that child
when he/she participates in school sponsored activities.”124
Since the school district did not contest the district
court’s finding that there was no substantial disruption to the
school environment,125 the question remains as to what extent
Tinker applies to off-campus speech. The concurrence
addressed this issue head-on and concluded that Tinker should
apply to off-campus speech.126 The concurrence referred to two
specific quotes in Tinker that support this statement. First, the
concurrence cited Tinker to state that student speech “‘in class
or out of it, which for any reason . . . materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others is’” not protected by the First Amendment.127
Secondly, the concurrence cited Tinker to say that “‘facts
which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast
substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities’” can be punished.128
Recognizing that the Internet has no “place,” the
concurrence stated that trying to put physical boundaries on
the First Amendment could only lead to serious problems with
a school’s ability to discipline.129 Using modern technology, a
substantial disruption can be caused by speech that takes place
121
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off-grounds.130 The concurrence compared this situation to
falsely shouting “fire” in a theater.131 Whether the person is
standing inside the theater or right outside shouting in, the
resulting panic and the resulting punishment would be the
same.132 That rationale applied in this context should also result
in the school being able to punish disruptive speech that occurs
both inside and outside the school.133 School officials have the
difficult job of maintaining an environment conducive to
learning, and applying Tinker would preserve their
authority.134
The court filed its opinion for J.S. v. Blue Mountain
School District on the same day as Layshock.135 Using her
parent’s home computer, J.S. and her friend K.L created a fake
Myspace profile under the name of their principal, James
McGonigle.136 The profile contained McGonigle’s official
photograph from the school district’s website.137 The principal
was given the name “M-Hoe” and was identified as a bisexual,
Alabama middle school principal.138 The profile contained
“crude content and vulgar language” ranging from juvenile
humor to personal attacks aimed at the principal and his
family.139 Under “M-Hoe’s” interests, the profile read
“detention, being a tight ass, riding the fraintrain, spending
time with my child (who looks like a gorilla), baseball, my
golden pen, fucking in my office, hitting on students and their
parents.”140 Under the “about me” section, the profile read:
HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes. It’s your oh so wonderful, hairy, expressionless,
sex addict, fagott . . . put on this world with a small dick PRINCIPAL[.] I
have come to myspace so i can pervert the minds of other principal’s [sic] to
be just like me. I know, I know, you’re all thrilled[.] Another reason I came to
myspace is because—I am keeping an eye on you students (who[m] I care for
so much)[.] For those who want to be my friend, and aren’t in my school[,] I
130
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love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long walks on the beach, tv, being a dick
head, and last but not least my darling wife who looks like a man (who
141
satisfies my needs) MY FRAINTRAIN[.]

J.S. said she intended the profile to be a joke.142 Initially the
profile was open to anyone, but the following day J.S. made it
private so that only “friends” could view it.143 Since the school
computers blocked Myspace, no student ever viewed the
profile at school.144 McGonigle learned about the profile from
another student who eventually brought a copy of the website
to McGonigle upon his request.145
After J.S. admitted to creating the profile, McGonigle
suspended J.S. and K.L. for ten days.146 He decided not to press
criminal charges.147 The school district said the profile created
“general rumblings” in the school.148 Additionally, two teachers
said that the profile was discussed during their class time,
which created a disruption, and one of the teachers had to tell
the students to stop talking several times and was forced to
raise his voice.149 However, the teacher admitted that it was
common for students to talk in class.150 Students approached
another teacher to talk about the profile, but this teacher said
class time was not disrupted.151 Counselor Frain also had to
reschedule several student meetings because of the disruption
the profile created.152
The Third Circuit assumed, but did not decide, that
Tinker applied in this case.153 Applying Tinker, the court found
that there was no substantial disruption to the school.154 The
court said that the profile was a joke and could only be viewed
141
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by friends.155 The profile did not identify who McGonigle was
by name, school, or location.156 Additionally, the profile was
“so juvenile and nonsensical that no reasonable person could
take its content seriously.”157 The only reason that the profile
was brought into school was because McGonigle requested it
be brought to him.158 Besides a few minutes of talking, no
disruption occurred during class time.159 The court found that
if Tinker’s black armbands could not have reasonably led
school authorities to forecast disruption then neither could
J.S.’s profile.160
Although the dissent in J.S. acknowledged the split with
the Second Circuit, the majority denied its existence.161 The
majority stated that the dissent overstated the Second Circuit’s
holdings. 162 The majority also dismissed the school district’s
argument that under Tinker, the school could punish J.S.
because the profile defamed McGonigle.163 The school district
based this argument on the language in Tinker, which states
that school officials could stop conduct that would “invad[e]
the rights of others.”164 The court found that there have been
no decisions expanding this language to those who are not
students.165 Further, the court found that broadening this
language would pose a danger to First Amendment
protections.166 The court also said J.S.’s speech could not be
regulated under Fraser because Fraser does not apply to offcampus speech.167
Once again, though, the question of whether Tinker
applies to off-campus speech was left open. The concurrence in
J.S., however, declared that Tinker should not apply to offcampus speech and that the First Amendment protects
155
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students’ off-campus speech to the same extent it protects that
of other citizens.168 Applying Tinker to off-campus speech
would “create a precedent with ominous implications” and
would allow schools to regulate student speech “no matter
where it takes place, where it occurs or what subject matter it
involves—so long as it causes a substantial disruption at
school.”169 Further, while J.S.’s speech may lack value, such
speech gives students an outlet to vent their frustrations
without resorting to violence.170 Applying Tinker to offcampus speech also leaves open the possibility that adults in the
community can be punished for what they say when it causes a
substantial disruption to the school environment.171
Yet the concurrence also noted that deciding where speech
takes place can be very complicated.172 Whether speech takes
place on- or off-campus cannot “turn solely on where the
speaker was sitting when the speech was originally uttered.” 173
Speech that is purposely sent to the school via e-mail could be
punished, but speech that could foreseeably make its way onto
campus should not be punished.174 The First Amendment
should be applied normally and as a result J.S.’s speech is
protected.175
The dissent in J.S. asserted that the Tinker standard was
not properly applied to the facts of the case.176 Tinker was not
intended to protect J.S.’s type of speech.177 Even though no
substantial disruption occurred, the profile’s potential to cause
disruption was reasonably foreseeable, which is sufficient
under Tinker.178 The speech could have interfered with the
educational environment by undermining McGonigle’s
168

Id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring).
Id. at 939 (Smith, J., concurring).
170
Id. at 940 (Smith, J., concurring). See also Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment
and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29
169

WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 675 (1988) (describing a safety valve rationale for free speech
where “dissidents will do less mischief if they are permitted to let off steam.”)
171
J.S., 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring).
172

Id.
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
177
J.S., 650 F.3d at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
178
Id.
173

376

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

[2013

authority and disrupting the educational progress179 or by
disrupting the operations of the classroom by not allowing
McGonigle and Frain to do their jobs. 180 The educational
process was undermined by accusing McGonigle of having sex
in his office, hitting on students and parents, and being a sex
addict, as well as the statement “I love children [and] sex (any
kind).”181
The dissent also argued that J.S.’s speech could cause school
officials to suffer psychological harm. McGonigle was
“embarrassed, belittled, and possibly defamed” by J.S.’s
speech.182 Not punishing this speech sends a message that the
school is condoning the student’s actions.183 Tolerating
insubordinate speech is contrary to the democratic notions of
education and the school’s role of inculcating values.184 The
school also needs the authority to punish this speech because
of the speech’s potential impact on the community.185 Parents
and other teachers could question McGonigle’s character,
especially with regards to his position as an educator
responsible for constantly interacting with children.186 Parents
could also foreseeably be worried about having a man who
engages in certain sexual behavior around their children.187
Furthermore, allowing this type of speech to go
unpunished could also lead teachers who are attacked to leave
the school or their profession entirely.188 Those who stay in the
profession may be so affected by the incident that they
become anxious and depressed and are not able to be effective
in the classroom or to maintain relationships with their
students.189 McGonigle and Frain would thus be less effective
as educators if they were unable to punish J.S.190
Unlike the majority, the dissent acknowledged that the
179
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J.S. decision caused a split with the Second Circuit.191 The
Second Circuit extended Tinker to apply to “off-campus

hostile and offensive student internet speech that is directed at
school officials [and] results in a substantial disruption of the
classroom environment.”192 The majority distinguished
Wisniewski and Doninger because J.S.’s speech could not be
taken seriously, and J.S. did not intend for the speech to reach
campus.193 However, the dissent stated that the court ignored
the other harmful effects of the speech and the fact that it was
reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach campus.194
IV. WHY TINKER SHOULD NOT APPLY TO OFF-CAMPUS
INTERNET STUDENT SPEECH

Wisniewski, Doninger, J.S., and Layshock make it
apparent that Tinker does not adequately apply to off-campus
speech. The Tinker standard was intended to regulate oncampus speech.195 Solely due to the off-campus nature of the
speech, courts have difficulty determining whether it was
reasonably foreseeable that the speech would cause a
substantial disruption to the school environment and whether
the off-campus speech amounted to more than a mere
apprehension of disturbance.196 Applying Tinker to these cases
results in decisions turning on specific facts and unpredictable
outcomes.
Courts’ lack of experience with the practical school-based
consequences of student Internet speech only exacerbates the
problem of applying Tinker. Tinker was meant to punish
speech that clearly interferes with the educational process.197
191
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Therefore, when a teacher’s ability to carry out a lesson is
clearly impaired, the teacher can take measures to remedy the
situation. However, disruptions that come from the Internet
do not always have the same immediate impact that occurs
during an on-campus incident. While there are plenty of
instances where a teacher is no longer able to teach because of
Internet speech,198 many times the disruption caused by
Internet speech is more properly classified as intangible or
emotional harm, as opposed to the traditional physical or
tangible disruption described in Tinker.199 Intangible harm, like
a general disrespect for a teacher’s authority, is much more
difficult to measure. The community’s response to the speech
can also be hard to measure. If the community takes the speech
seriously, it can result in an atmosphere of contempt. It is this
harm to the school environment that is left without a remedy
under Tinker. The Second and Third Circuit’s attempt to
distinguish this intangible harm is what has complicated these
decisions.
Further, extending the Tinker standard to Internet
speech has the potential to expand a school’s authority to
punish students in unnecessary ways. The Internet is a forum
for students to express their feelings on various topics and this
may not always be conducive to the messages that the school
seeks to promote. Students are entitled to criticize the
educational process and those that contribute to it. If a school
is allowed to punish mere “name calling,” the essential aspects
of First Amendment protections are lost.200
Finally, Tinker holds that any speech that is reasonably
foreseeable to cause a substantial disruption may be
punished.201 This idea was expanded by the cases in the Second
Circuit to justify punishing the student.202 According to the
Second Circuit, as long as it was reasonably foreseeable that the
speech would come onto school grounds and cause a material
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disruption, it could be punished by the school.203 Yet with the
Internet, few instances exist where it would not be reasonably
foreseeable that the speech would reach school grounds. The
speech could be brought onto campus by another student,
searched for on the Internet by a curious school official, or
overheard in gossip and rumors among students and
teachers.204 There is virtually no such thing as private Internet
speech. It should be assumed that what a student writes on the
Internet could make its way onto school grounds. The Second
and Third Circuits have relied on Tinker and come to varied
conclusions because the courts have no other standard to rely
on, not because it is the most applicable standard. This is clear
from the debate between the concurring and dissenting judges
in Layshock and J.S., as well as the majority’s clear avoidance of
the issue in both of these cases. Therefore, courts need a better
standard to distinguish the school from the home and a way to
preserve a parent’s right to govern speech that takes place
within the home.
V. WHY DEFAMATION IN TORT IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE
REMEDY
An ultimate decision not to bring criminal charges
against the offending student is a recurring theme in the
Second and Third Circuit cases.205 While the teacher or
principal involved in each case debated pursuing charges,
ultimately they realized that a lawsuit would not be a
successful means of remedying the situation.206 The police even
stated in one instance that the person hurt would be unlikely
to prevail.207 Therefore, the only possible remedy left was a
civil suit, most likely under the tort of defamation.208 While
defamation is a possible solution, it is an extremely difficult
case to prove and does not address the immediate harm
203
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suffered by the school itself.209
Yet those against extending Tinker to speech outside the
school look to the availability of tort remedies, such as
defamation and libel specifically.210 Defamation has
traditionally been governed by state law. While each state
differs on its requirements for defamation, the basic elements
of defamation, specifically libel, are that (1) the defendant
must publish (2) material that sufficiently identifies the
plaintiff (3) which injures the plaintiff’s reputation (4) by false
statements, purportedly of fact, or of opinion implying the
existence of facts and (5) is unprivileged.211 A statement is
considered defamatory if it falsely “tends so to harm the
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him.”212 To be published, it is only required that
the defendant communicate information to a third party.213 In
most defamation cases, plaintiffs are allowed to recover
general damages.214 This means that a plaintiff can recover for
the emotional trauma and harm suffered as a result of the
reputational injury without any proof beyond the defamatory
nature of the communication.215
While defamation is a tort remedy, it overlaps with First
Amendment law, complicating the remedy by placing
constitutional constraints on what must be shown to recover.
New York Times v. Sullivan implemented a higher standard of
actual malice for defamation suits by public officials.216 The
case addressed a full-page advertisement in The New York
209
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Times that was signed by prominent religious, entertainment,

and community leaders asking for donations to defend Martin
Luther King, Jr. against perjury and to assist with the Civil
Rights struggle.217 The advertisement contained several false
statements.218 The Montgomery City Commissioner Sullivan,
whose duty it was to oversee the police, filed a defamation
action against The New York Times and four of the people
who had signed their names to the advertisement.219 The
Supreme Court, finding that Alabama’s defamation law was
too lenient and fearing the chilling effect a lenient standard
could have on free speech, established a new standard for
defamation actions against public officials.220 The Court
ultimately held that a public official may not recover damages
for a defamatory statement relating to his or her official
conduct unless it can be shown that the statement was made
with “actual malice,” that is, with “knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”221
This heightened standard increased the difficulty of public
officials’ recovering in defamation suits.222
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court addressed the
standard that private individuals must meet in order to show
defamation by publishers or broadcasters.223 States must have
defamation standards requiring some degree of fault, meaning
a minimum of negligence.224 The Court also found that by
finding at least negligence, the party could recover for “actual
injury,” which was expanded to include “impairment of
reputation and standing in the community, personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.”225 The
Supreme Court has not addressed cases involving private
individuals against private individuals, so the common law
elements of defamation continue to control these types of
cases.226
217

Id. at 256..
Id. at 257.
219
Id. at 256.
220
Id. at 296.
221
Id.
222
See id. at 254.
223
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
224
Id. at 347.
225
Id. at 350.
226
Id. at 345–46.
218

382

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

[2013

With more case law regulating the constitutional
boundaries of defamation in tort, defamation is not an easy
case for a teacher or principal to bring against a student. First,
courts are split over whether school principals and teachers are
public figures, which means that they must show actual malice
to succeed in a defamation suit.227 For those school officials in
jurisdictions with the heightened standard of proof, the case
becomes even more difficult to bring. Additionally, forcing a
school official to wait for a defamation suit to take place, does
not allow the school to stop the disruption immediately.228 The
student may have graduated by the time the suit is brought,
and by that time the harm is already done. Even though the
student may still be prosecuted, without immediate
punishment, the school cannot set an example for other
students that such behavior is unacceptable. This is important
because Tinker and its progeny demonstrate that schools
impose punishments to seek retribution and deter other
students from repeating the same conduct. However, school
punishments are only effective when they are understandable
to students. Students do not appreciate the consequences or
availability of a defamation suit in the way they would
understand suspension or expulsion. In a defamation suit, the
student’s parents would have to pay the judgment and the
student would remain in school. The consequences of a school
punishment, rather than the monetary punishment imposed by
a defamation suit, are much more palpable for the student and
can serve as a more effective deterrent. Additionally, in a
defamation suit, the person written about is the one who is
able to seek a remedy. Yet when a student writes about a school
official, the harm is not just to the victim, but also to the
school and the school district. The authority of the school as a
whole is undermined when students cannot be properly
punished and monitored and when students do not trust in the
227
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authority of the people in charge. A defamation suit does not
properly remedy this school-wide injury.
Further, bringing a lawsuit is very costly.229 Many school
officials do not have the proper means or resources to initiate a
suit or carry it to trial, especially on a teacher’s or principal’s
average salary.230 Even if the school official could afford to
carry out a suit and subsequently won, the student and his or
her family may be judgment-proof.231 Additionally, a real
defamation suit requires individuals to “air their dirty
laundry,” involving an investigation into much of their private
background. Most people would rather not bring a lawsuit
than allow the public to pry into their personal lives. Finally,
schools, and not courts, are in the best position to determine
whether the speech had a harmful effect on the school
environment. This is because schools understand the special
environment of a school and the need to address certain issues
that would not normally be problems in other settings.232
The availability of a tort remedy is not sufficient as a
substitute for regulating student speech under the First
Amendment. However, there is a way to apply constitutional
remedies to the special school setting without fully removing a
student’s constitutional protections and without hindering a
school’s ability to regulate student behavior. As shown by
Tinker, the First Amendment standard was modified in order
to fit the needs of schools. Although that standard may no
longer be applicable for cases of Internet speech, the idea
behind the standard was to make more lenient constitutional
229
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standards for students.233 The same concept has been applied to
Fourth Amendment rights. In New Jersey v. TLO, the Court
modified search and seizure protections so that school officials
may inspect a student’s belongings when they have a
reasonable suspicion—a lower standard than probable cause—
that a student has violated school rules.234 Essentially, there is a
trend of modifying constitutional protections for students
that should be an important consideration when balancing the
rights of students and schools.
VI: APPLYING A MODIFIED DEFAMATION STANDARD TO FREE
SPEECH
The best way to address concerns about defamation of
school officials is not through defamation in tort, but rather
through the application of a modified defamation standard to
students’ First Amendment rights. Essentially, the elements of
defamation should be used as a model in order to determine
what off-campus Internet speech a school can and cannot
punish. The modified defamation standard would replace the
Tinker constitutional standard in cases brought by students
against schools for alleged violations of First Amendment
rights. Therefore, if a school punishes a student and the
student brings a claim against the school district that his or her
First Amendment rights have been infringed, the court must
rely on the following standard to determine if the school was
within its rights to punish the student. This standard would
also be used in schools’ official policies regarding speech that is
punishable. This would allow school rules to flow from court
orders, truly connecting the two regulating institutions.
Additionally, the following method would allow the school to
react immediately, while constraining the school from
punishing speech that does not rise to a defamatory level.
Using defamation as a model, the new standard proposes
that a student should be punished if the student’s statement
about the school official (1) is defamatory, (2) is published by
the student, (3) is related to a school official who works in the
school itself, (4) is related to the official’s capacity in his or her
role as a school official, and (5) rises to the level of negligence.
233
234
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There would be no requirement to prove monetary damages,
nor would there be a requirement to prove that the statement
resulted in actual reputational harm, just that it had the
potential to do so.
First, the student’s statement must be defamatory. A
statement is defamatory if it “tends to expose the plaintiff to
public contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, or induce an
evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking persons,
and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society.”235
A student’s statement must rise to this level because, while the
Supreme Court has recognized that students’ First Amendment
rights are not lost at the schoolhouse gate,236 schools have an
obligation to preserve their educational missions. This
balancing act means that schools do not have the authority to
regulate student opinions and thoughts that are simply
upsetting to the victim, especially when the speech takes place
off school grounds. Internet speech, however, falls into a gray
area because Internet speech written at home has no physical
connection to the school grounds, but is also not restricted to
the privacy of the student’s home. Therefore, student Internet
speech is neither subject to full First Amendment protections,
nor subject to full school control.
While the Supreme Court has never overruled Tinker,
through subsequent cases, the Court continues to distinguish
Tinker and chip away at protections for student speech. Fraser
carves out an exception for “vulgar and lewd” because it
“undermine[s] the school’s basic educational mission” and the
school does not want other students exposed to that
language.237 Hazelwood allows schools to remove school
newspaper articles on divorce and pregnancy to make sure that
“readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be
inappropriate for their level of maturity.”238 Similarly,
defamatory speech undermines a school’s mission by imposing
reputational harm on school officials, and the school has an
interest in preventing other students from being exposed to
this speech in order to prevent them from mimicking that
behavior. The political speech in Tinker goes to the heart of
235

Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 379 (1977).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
237
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
238
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
236

386

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

[2013

the First Amendment in a way that vulgar speech, schoolsponsored speech, and reputational harm does not. Defamatory
speech is easily aligned with prior Supreme Court decisions as
an exception to the broad standard of Tinker and can be
categorized as the type of student speech a school should be
able to regulate.
The next element is that the student must publish the
statement. To meet this standard, the student must have
written the statement online and have it read by a third party.
However, to make this more specific and applicable to the
school setting, the third party must be a school official or
another student at the school. Students and other school
officials would have the greatest impact on whether a teacher’s
or principal’s authority is undermined. Therefore, if just the
student’s parents read the online speech, this element would
not be met. It must be read by a person who has the ability to
spread the information to other individuals at the school.
The third element requires that the person being written
about is a school official who works in the school. This would
mainly apply to principals, teachers, deans, guidance
counselors, and others in positions of authority within the
school, but not to superintendents or members of the school
board. If the official serves in multiple roles, then the court
must evaluate which role was implicated when the statement
was made.
The student’s statement needs to be the proximate cause of
the school official’s authority being undermined. This includes
being unable to perform job functions effectively or not
receiving the same respect as before. While the court would
have to evaluate the specific facts of the case, students
generally do not directly interact with someone such as a
superintendent or a member of the board and do not have the
same educational relationship. Therefore, the person being
written about must somehow be directly responsible for the
student’s education.
The fourth element requires that the statement relate to
the official in his or her capacity as a school official. This
means that if the statement is unrelated to the educational
mission of schooling to the point that it does not question a
school official’s ability to educate, then the statement should
not be regulated. However, this provision should be read
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broadly because most defamatory statements will have some
relation to officials in their educational capacity. Examples of
statements related to officials in their educational capacity
include statements that a teacher or principal makes sexual
advances on students, engages in inappropriate sexual behavior,
or is having intercourse with another school official. In
evaluating this element, the court must evaluate the nature of
the statement and its capacity to have a real effect on the
school environment.
The fifth element asks whether the student’s statement
rises to the level of negligence—whether the student knew or,
in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that the
statement was false or would create a false impression in some
material respect. Alternatively, the standard asks whether a
reasonable student would believe the statement was true. A
reasonable student does not have the same means or resources
to research a topic or a statement, as would a publisher,
broadcaster, or even an adult. Using an objective standard, if a
student heard a statement and wrote it online with a
reasonable belief that the statement had some merit to it, then
the statement should not be able to be regulated by the school.
Students do not have the same capacity to filter what they
hear or to decipher what is true from what is not. Therefore, if
the court determines that a student wrote the statement and in
good faith thought the statement was true, that should be
enough to overcome any punishment.
The fifth element requires that the standard be lowered
from actual malice to negligence in all cases involving a
student’s defamatory writing about a school official.
Although some courts consider school officials to be public
officials in defamation cases, thus requiring them to prove
actual malice, in instances involving students, the standard
must be modified to allow schools to regulate student
behavior. The actual malice standard is too high a burden for a
school official to meet. Students can claim that they were
unsure if the statement was false or not. Rumors can be spread
and students can say that simply hearing the rumor made them
unsure whether the statement was definitely false. Therefore,
the standard must be lowered so that schools can punish speech
that is deemed unacceptable while not completely infringing
on students’ First Amendment rights. In order to lower this
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standard, however, it is the school’s responsibility to make
these standards clear to its students. The school should have an
official policy that spells out the standard and describes the
students’ liability. Giving students notice will help ensure that
students’ procedural due process rights are protected.
Unlike defamation in tort, the school would not seek to
recover damages. It is simply a standard for determining
whether the school could punish the student’s speech.
Therefore, there is no requirement under this standard that
requires the school or the victim to show that there was any
form of monetary loss. Even further, schools or individuals are
not required to show that any reputational harm was actually
suffered. Proving that students no longer listen to a teacher or
principal in the same way can be difficult to prove. Much of
the harm a school official will suffer will be emotional or
intangible. Requiring proof of reputational harm is too high
of a burden to put on professionals, especially if they are not
seeking to be compensated. Therefore, all that is required is
that the statement be defamatory and thus have the potential
for damaging the reputation of the individual about whom
the student writes.
The policy behind modifying the defamation standard is
the concern that the authority of the victim, as well as the
school itself will be undermined. The injury is not just to the
person who is being written about, but is a school-wide injury.
The school’s culture and environment suffers when a student
can write defamatory comments about a school official and
get away with it.239 When a student cannot be punished, the
school’s lack of action sets an example that the student is more
powerful than the principal or teacher.240 As a result, school
officials will not be able to carry out their educational duties
effectively, whether this means controlling a classroom or
enforcing disciplinary measures.241 The school could be
disrupted to the point where the school and its school officials
are unable to function. For example, the teacher in Wisniewski
“became distressed and had to stop teaching the student’s
class.”242 In a Pennsylvania case, a teacher who was written
239
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about on the Internet by a student “suffered stress, anxiety,
loss of appetite, loss of sleep, loss of weight . . . a general sense
of loss of well being[,] . . . short-term memory loss[,] . . . an
inability to go out of the house and mingle with
crowds[,] . . . headaches[,] and was required to take antianxiety/anti-depressant medication.”243 In a Seventh Circuit
case, a teacher subjected to anti-homosexual speech suffered a
“nervous breakdown that ultimately resulted in his
termination.”244 These examples demonstrate the power that
Internet student speech can have, the disruption it can cause,
and why schools need a workable standard by which to punish
this speech.
Preventing a school from punishing the student also
undermines the democratic notions of schooling, which
includes the inculcation of societal values and morals.245
Schools are given the great responsibility of teaching students
cultural norms and the proper way to behave. The Court has
modified protections for students in order to serve the
compelling governmental interest of teaching students, and
this cannot stop just because the speech has exited the school
door. Public speech on the Internet is no more private than
shouting a statement into a crowded room. Therefore, there
must be a way to control what takes place on the Internet.
There must be a balance between both student and school
interests; otherwise, Internet speech has the potential to
damage the fundamental educational mission itself.
VII. PROPOSED STANDARD APPLICATION
While the outcomes of Wisniewski, Doninger, Layshock,
and J.S. vary, application of the proposed standard will create
logical and consistent outcomes. The proposed standard applies
to defamatory Internet speech, which is the prevailing type of
speech seen in these cases. This standard does not extend to oncampus speech, which would still be governed by Tinker. For
example, in Wisniewski, the plaintiff created an “IM icon”
which showed a drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at his
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 35–36 (2d Cir.
2007).
243
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English teacher’s head, with dots representing splattered
blood.246 This speech could not be classified as defamatory. If
the claim is found to have merit, the speech is closer to a “true
threat” and therefore, would not be protected under the First
Amendment despite Tinker’s protections. However, in this
case, the speech icon was found not to be indicative of a true
threat.247 Therefore, under the proposed standard the school
would not be able to punish the plaintiff.
If the Supreme Court wanted to regulate off-campus
threats that were intended as jokes, the Supreme Court could
extend Tinker to apply, since a threat is more likely to have a
material and substantial disruption on the school. This type of
threat could even be justified under the Morse rationale
because threatening speech could pose a substantial danger to
the school even when it does not take place directly on school
grounds. However, this would require extending Morse to
more than school-sponsored activities. Further, the issue of
true threats is outside the scope of this Note and is not the
typical subject matter of Internet student speech.
In Doninger, the plaintiff called the school
administrators “douchebags in central office” and encouraged
classmates to “piss [Paula Schwartz] off more” by sending
phone calls and e-mails asking for Jamfest to continue as
scheduled.248 Applying the proposed standard, it is clear that
the statement was published on the Internet and related to two
school officials, a principal and a superintendent. The speech
regarding Principal Niehoff would qualify as a statement
regarding a school official that works in the school. However,
the statements made about Schwartz would fail to meet the
third prong of this standard because she is a superintendent
who does not directly work in the school. Therefore, there is
less of a concern that her ability to work in the school
environment would be undermined. Applying the fourth
element to Niehoff, most of the statements made were about
Schwartz.249 Doninger asked that the phone calls and e-mails be
send to Schwartz specifically.250 Schwartz was also called a
246
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248
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“dirty whore” by someone responding to the blog.251 Further,
the statement “douchebags in central office”252 most likely
relates to Schwartz as well, since the principal would not be
located in the central office.
Even if Schwartz did qualify under this prong, it is
unlikely that this statement would rise to the level of
defamatory speech. While calling the administrators
“douchebags” can be viewed as disrespectful and would likely
not be tolerated on school grounds, it does not rise to a level
that exposes the administrators to public contempt or ridicule.
No reasonable person would think that this phrase would
destroy administrators’ reputation, as it does not accuse them
of participating in unacceptable conduct or undermine their
ability to do their jobs. Therefore, under the proposed
standard, Doninger would not have been punished.
The Second Circuit case holdings under the proposed
standard starkly contrast with the recent outcomes in the
Third Circuit cases. In Layshock, the plaintiff accused the
principal of using steroids and drugs, drinking, shoplifting,
and being a transgender individual.253 Under the proposed
standard, this statement was published and related to a school
official in his role as such. These statements can easily be
argued to be defamatory. They accuse the principal of
committing illegal acts and expose his reputation as a role
model for children to ridicule. These statements could change
the opinion of parents, students, and other school workers
with regards to how they view the principal. The statements
also reflect poorly on the character and reputation of the
principal. Although being transgendered is becoming more
acceptable in society, many people still do not condone this
lifestyle.254 Further, although drinking is a legal activity for
adults, the perception that the principal is a heavy drinker,
when he works so closely with children, could expose him to
251
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public ridicule and contempt. Finally, this statement could rise
to the level of negligence since the student admitted to
knowing that the statements were false. A reasonable student
would know that these statements would create a false
impression about the principal, even if they were intended as a
joke. Therefore, in Layshock, the school could punish the
student under the proposed standard.
In J.S., the language used by the student was even more
disturbing. The plaintiff accused the principal of being a sex
addict and loving children and sex.255 The statement painted the
principal to be a pedophile.256 Once again, the statement was
written online and related to a school official in his official
capacity. Further, the statement could be viewed as
defamatory. As a principal, McGonigle’s role was to protect the
welfare of students. Accusing him of loving sex and children
certainly questions his ability to serve as an effective principal
and to be around children in the first place. Hearing this
statement could cause many parents to be concerned about him
being in an environment with their children, and his
reputation is clearly undermined if he is accused of having sex
with children. Additionally, the speech rises to the level of
negligence because the student admitted to writing a false
statement, and a reasonable student would know that this
would cause others to think of McGonigle in a false light.
Therefore, under the proposed standard, the school could
punish the student.
Under this proposed standard, the Second Circuit cases
would be decided in favor of the students instead of the
schools and the Third Circuit cases would be decided in favor
of the schools. Yet the four decisions would make sense as a
whole since they would be based on the same definitive
standard. If the statement were defamatory and met the other
prongs of the proposed standard, the school could punish the
student. Under the Tinker standard, the judges themselves
were confused as to whether they were really applying Tinker,
so the proposed standard clears up any inconsistencies. The
proposed standard also punishes defamatory speech, which is
considered unprotected speech, while protecting students’
rights to express their opinions. Both courts tried to achieve
255
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this balance, but failed. This proposed standard accomplishes
their goal.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has always addressed student free
speech cases as a balance between First Amendment protections
and the democratic values of teaching and schooling. Tinker is
the classic example of modifying First Amendment protections
for students in order to address both interests. The standard
proposed by this Note follows suit. Defamatory speech is
harmful to both school officials and the school itself. This
Note’s proposed standard would allow schools to more easily
address the needs of the special school environment and to
punish defamatory speech. This standard is more appropriate
than Tinker when addressing the Second and Third Circuit
split. The school does not have to deal with the difficult task
of determining exactly which off-campus speech can be
considered a substantial disruption. Instead, the school can use
a definitive standard of what is defamatory speech and what
reasonable students should know about the effects of their
speech. Therefore, using the common law elements of
defamation to form the basis of a new First Amendment
provision is the most appropriate way to address the issue of
punishing off-campus Internet student speech.

Reesa Miles*

*

J.D. Candidate 2013, St. John’s University School of Law; M.A. 2010, Columbia
University Teachers College; B.A. 2009, Boston University. Ms. Miles would like to
thank Professor Rosemary Salomone for all of her advice and guidance in writing this
Note.

